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Rules of origin are legitimate policy instruments to 
prevent trade deflection in a preferential trade agreement 
short of a customs union. Trade deflection takes place 
when a product imported into the preferential trade 
agreement through the member with the lowest external 
tariff is transhipped to a higher-tariff member, while 
yielding a benefit for the re-exporter. Yet, when captured 
by special interest groups, rules of origin can restrict 
trade beyond what is needed to prevent trade deflection. 
By how much do political economy factors account for 
the stringency of rules of origin?  This study quantifies 
the impact of both determinants – those considered 
“justifiable” because they prevent trade deflection and 
those deemed to arise from “political economy” forces—
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on the restrictiveness of rules of origin under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, approximated by a 
restrictiveness index. The main finding is that political 
economy forces, especially from the United States, raised 
significantly the restrictiveness of the rules of origin. 
Indeed, in industries where political-economy forces 
were strong prior to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, as when the U.S. Most Favored Nation 
tariff was high or the revealed comparative advantage 
of Mexico (the United States) was strong (weak), more 
stringent rules of origin were introduced. Thus, stricter 
rules of origin are associated with higher production costs 
reducing the potential benefits of enhanced market access 
that is initially pursued by this type of agreement. 
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The increasing number of North-South Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), whether 
reciprocal (such as NAFTA) or non reciprocal (such as the Generalized System of Preferences) 
has generated renewed interest in market access conditions and the potential benefits reaped from 
this type of agreement. Rules of origin (RoO) are increasingly perceived as crucial issues in this 
context.  Whether reciprocal or not, when two or more countries sign a Preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA), short of a Customs Union, they eliminate tariffs on products sold within their 
group while still maintaining their own varied tariff-schedules for imports from countries outside 
the group. They risk trade deflection: exporters may move a product into the nation with the 
lowest tariff, and then trans-ship it to a higher-tariff group member. Rules of origin (RoO) are 
then needed to prevent trade deflection.   
In practice, RoO usually involve a set of complex norms and regulations that are negotiated 
on a product-by-product basis prior to the signature of any PTA. The process may become 
complex and cumbersome, giving enormous scope for influence by organized interest groups 
from any of the partner countries in a way that suits best their interests and is not directly related 
to their economic justification of preventing trade deflection.  As a result, RoO can curb trade 
beyond what is needed to this means, by creating additional costs to producers that can be even 
larger than their expected benefits from preferential market access, and therefore limit the 
potential benefits from improved market access originally intended by the PTA. 
A number of recent empirical contributions focused on assessing the effects of RoO on export 
costs, trade volumes and utilization rates of trade preferences, as well as on their political 
economy determinants.  On the latter, Estevadeordal (2000) and Cadot et al. (2006b) estimated 
endogenous RoO equations for NAFTA, the free trade agreement between Mexico, Canada and 
the United States. By regressing an ordinal index of restrictiveness for RoO on a range of 
variables controlling for the extent of trade preferences and other variables, both studies assessed 
that sectors benefiting from large trade preferences also have stringent RoO. This raises the 
possibility that RoO may indeed reflect vested interests beyond preventing trade deflection. 
  2This paper seeks to identify directly the contribution of political economy factors in 
accounting for the stringency of RoO under NAFTA. It disentangles the impact of the two types 
of determinants, those deemed justifiable on the grounds of preventing trade deflection, and those 
deemed to arise from “political economy” forces largely reflecting lobby efforts to capture any 
rents associated with preferences granted under NAFTA. By decomposing the determinants of 
RoO restrictiveness into these two groups, I estimate a hypothetical distribution of the stringency 
of RoO from which the identified political economy determinants have been purged.  To my 
knowledge, such quantification has not been attempted so far.  
To anticipate, the econometric estimates in the paper show that both variables measuring the 
potential for trade deflection and variables measuring lobbying activities account to the 
restrictiveness of RoO which is proxied by an ordinal restrictiveness (R-index). Political economy 
forces, especially from the US, significantly raised the restrictiveness of RoO under NAFTA. 
These results imply that, by being ‘unnecessarily strict’ RoO raise production costs further 
thereby reducing the potential benefits of reciprocal market access.   It is worth mentioning that 
the NAFTA text foresaw the need to reform RoOs through Executive decrees or proclamations, 
without going through the legislative bodies of the three NAFTA countries (see for instance, 
Section 202 of the U.S. NAFTA Implementation Act).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 succinctly discusses the economic 
implications of RoO, in particular the efficiency and political economy effects associated with 
trade preferences and RoO. A brief description of the different types of RoO under NAFTA as 
well as the index summarizing their restrictiveness is provided in section 3. Section 4 presents the 
empirical methodology, and the results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. The economic implications of RoO: efficiency and political economy aspects        
 
As implied by their name, RoO define the “rules” according to which a good is considered as 
“originating” from a member country of a PTA and hence qualifies to enjoy preferential market 
access to all members in the PTA. The rest of this section briefly discusses the economic 
  3implications of RoO, in particular the efficiency and rent effects associated with trade preferences 
and RoO since they motivate lobbying activities by interest groups. 
Within a PTA, the economic justification of RoO is to prevent trade deflection, which is 
possible whenever the members’ external MFN tariffs are different as there is an incentive to 
import a good in the PTA via the lowest-tariff country and re-export it at a profit to higher-tariff 
partners
1. To this effect, RoO determine whether a particular product has undergone “substantial 
transformation” in a country member to the PTA so it can be considered as originating from that 
country and benefit from preferential market access to other member countries
2. However, there 
is no simple and standard way to ascertain how much value should be added in the production of 
a good to qualify it as having undergone “substantial transformation”.  Indeed, the transformation 
that a product may undergo in a country could range from slight transformation (e. g. simple 
packing) to full production. RoO granting originating status when transformation is slight would 
be fully liberalizing whereas in the opposite case would be prohibitive.   
Defining substantial transformation, and setting-up RoO accordingly is closely associated 
with political economy considerations since RoO have redistributive implications. In that sense, 
RoO can be seen to operate as “cushions” following the implementation of a PTA (or a Free 
Trade Area, which is a type of PTA). They reduce the losses that import-competing producers 
would suffer from an otherwise liberalizing Free Trade Area (FTA), while reducing rival export-
oriented producers’ gains from preferential market access as they face additional costs of 
compliance that reduce their potential gains. This cost-raising effect for exporters is higher, the 
stricter RoO, as first noted by Krueger (1999). However, the impact on exporters’ costs is 
bounded. When RoO are stringent enough, so that potential costs of compliance exceed potential 
                                                 
1 In developing countries, RoO are often justified as part of an industrialization strategy aimed at developing industries 
with high value-added content. 
2 Under international law, the origin of a good is also given to the last country adding “substantial transformation” to 
the product. 
  4benefits from market access, exporters prefer not to comply with RoO and export to the partner 
under the MFN tariff so that the status-quo -prevailing before the FTA- is preserved
3.  
In the case of preferential trade agreements, compliance with RoO are a source of trade costs 
that would not occur if the product is sold domestically or without using the trade preferences 
granted by the agreement.  Indeed, easing-up  RoO would cut down exports costs creating an 
incentive to export diversification, where more productive firms would become exporters of new 
varieties under relaxed RoO, along the lines of the empirical evidence found by Demidova, Kee 
and Krishna (2006).  
Clearly, producers from one country competing with exporters of other member countries, 
have an incentive to persuade their government to negotiate stricter RoO, i.e. requiring a greater 
degree of “transformation”, since this raises the costs of their rivals, while mitigating their losses. 
At the other extreme, producers of exporter-oriented sectors would benefit from lenient or non-
binding RoO, since they would avoid an increase in costs. Therefore, they have an incentive to get 
mobilized to countervail rival import-competing lobbies that profit from more stringent RoO
4.  
In a vertical type of trade, as in the case of many activities under NAFTA, RoO can also 
procure captive markets to producers upstream. It occurs when exporters of intermediate goods 
manage to impose RoO designed to compel downstream producers of other member countries to 
purchase their intermediates so that their exports fulfill the “origin” requirements and benefit from 
preferential market access conferred by the FTA arrangement. Northern producers of 
intermediates may take advantage of them and emerge as winners, since Southern producers 
might have chosen not to source intermediates from the Northern partner in the absence of 
                                                 
3 The effects of RoO on the imported-good market are similar to those caused by tariffs even if they are more difficult 
to quantify than in the case of tariffs, due to their complexity.  However, the distortion induced by RoO generate a 
deadweight loss that could be comparable with a government’s tariff revenue in the case of an “equivalent” tariff, 
assuming constant per-unit costs of compliance with RoO. Carrère and de Melo (2006) estimate econometrically an 
average ad-valorem equivalent of 3.2% for NAFTA’s RoO by extracting information on the responsiveness of 
preference utilization rates on different types of RoO. 
4 To the extent that importers (or intermediaries) may have market power, a considerable part of the rents due to tariff 
preferences are likely to be captured by them, rather than by the exporters themselves, as found by Olarreaga and Ozden 
(2005) in the case of apparel exports to the US under AGOA. Then, intermediaries are encouraged to lobby for less 
restrictive RoO, aligning themselves with exporters from the other country, so that the latter do not face bigger costs 
and the volume of their exports under preferential access increases. 
  5restrictive RoO. This is called trade suppression by Rodriguez (2001).  Northern partners are 
generally producers of the intermediate good that may be capital intensive and the Southern 
producers are the final good assemblers, an activity generally labor-intensive
5. Indeed, in the 
presence of RoO requiring a higher value content of inputs produced in the “zone”, Southern 
exporters of the final good have to increase their purchases of intermediates from Northern 
producers, who may not have the lowest production costs.   
RoO resulting from negotiations not only depend on the effectiveness of lobbies within each 
member party, but also on the relative bargaining power of governments. In the case of a North-
South FTA, it has been recognized that the Northern partner typically has greater leverage than 
Southern members in influencing RoO. On the basis of strong evidence, some authors (such as 
Anson et al.(2005) and Cadot et al.(2006b)) have assumed that it is exclusively the Northern 
government that sets the level of restrictiveness of RoO in such a way that Southern producers are 
left on their “participation constraint”. In such a case, producers stay indifferent between 
complying with RoO and using preferential market access, or not complying with them and 
exporting “preference-free” under the MFN tariff.
6   
RoO have an advantage over exclusions that can be incorporated in the agreement. Instead, 
they provide more flexibility and thus, an intermediate situation between full-liberalization and 
full-exclusion helping to strike a balance between conflicting interests.  Indeed, while negotiating 
an FTA, RoO can be seen as fundamental to assure political support for the successful completion 
of the agreement from politically sensitive sectors. There is some anecdotic evidence on the 
                                                 
5 Textiles and apparel are a typical case.  In the production of apparel, “it is the sewing stage that has been most difficult 
to mechanize. Almost every other stage of apparel production has gradually replaced labour with capital, in a trend that 
mirrors cotton production in the US. Despite millions of dollars in research in mechanization, people are still required 
to piece together fabric and feed it into sewing machines.” (Rivoli (2005), pp 68). 
6 This assumption is very convenient to model endogenous RoO in the case of “captive markets for intermediates” to 
illustrate how southern producers are confronted to a trade-off between profiting from preferential market access and 
using more expensive intermediates from the North to comply with RoO.  However, when this assumption is applied to 
a more general model, two opposite corner solutions are found concerning RoO imposed by the Northern government. 
In the first corner solution, RoO take the strictest possible level  (fully-excluding) for a good when the Northern country 
is importer of it and in the seconde one, RoO take the more lenient possible level of RoO (fully-liberalizing) when the 
country is exporter (assuming that there is only one type of producer in each tariff line). In reality, the restrictiveness of 
RoO is observed to vary widely even across products of the same sector. 
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US Representatives from North Carolina shifted their stance from opposition to the extension of 
fast-track procedures (a de facto authorization for the Bush administration to pursue NAFTA 
negotiations), to support to it, once RoO known as “yarn-forward rules” were negotiated for 
textiles and apparel. These particularly ingenious rules require that the three basic processes of 
making a piece of apparel (the making of fibber, cloth, then clothing) take place in a NAFTA 
country.  Since textile producers in North Carolina had a comparative advantage in textile 
production within the NAFTA region, they stood to gain by this policy that forced Mexican 
producers of apparel to buy textiles from them, instead of from other cheaper sources. 
 
 
3. ROO under NAFTA: description and measurement of their restrictiveness 
Generally, there are two components: regime-wide RoO and product-specific rules of origin 
(PSRO).   Regime-wide RoO are described in appendix A.1.  PSRO determine eligibility at the 
tariff-line level according to two basic criteria.  
Firstly, the wholly obtained or produced criterion is employed when the whole production 
process and all inputs used in this process should be originated from the same country in order to 
attribute originating status to the good.  Only one country enters into consideration in attributing 
origin.  
Secondly, the substantial transformation criterion involves two or more countries that take 
part in the production process.  RoO define the methods by which it can be ascertained whether 
the good has undergone “substantial transformation” in the exported country to be granted 
“originating” status.  It comprises three main components, which can be used in combination with 
each other or as stand-alone:  
i)   A change in tariff classification (CTC) can be expressed at various levels of aggregation 
in the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature
7. From broader to narrower, origin is granted if the 
                                                 
7 The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, commonly known as "HS Nomenclature", is an 
international multipurpose nomenclature elaborated under the auspices of the World Customs Organization. Although 
only 116 countries are Contracting Parties to this Convention, more than 190 administrations worldwide apply the US 
nomenclature, mostly to set up their national customs tariff and for the collection of economic statistical data. The HS 
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HS); or heading (CH at the four-digit level); or subheading (CS at the six-digit level), or item (CI 
at the eight-digit level), than any of its imported inputs. Changes of classification expressed at 
broader levels of aggregation are, in principle, more constraining.  
The HS schedule was not designed specifically as a system used to confer origin.  Indeed, in 
some cases it can be argued that a given level of transformation (however measured) can be 
identified by a change of heading for some products, whereas it cannot be identified for others. As 
a result, schemes using the CTC can provide a rationale for a wide range of exceptions generally 
prohibiting the use of non-originating materials from a certain chapter, heading, sub-heading, or 
item.  Allowances, on the contrary, allow the use of non-originating materials from certain 
classifications. 
ii) The domestic content rule, or regional value content (VC) entails a minimum 
percentage of local value added in the originating country, or a maximum percentage of value 
originating in non-member countries.  
iii) Technical Requirement (TECH) requires the product to undergo specific manufacturing 
or processing operations in the originating country or prohibits the use of certain inputs.   
Appendix A3 provides examples of the definition of RoO under NAFTA, which show that 
product-specific rules of origin (PSRO) are complex and difficult to measure because of the 
combinations of criteria within and across regimes. In the case of NAFTA, the first column of 
table 1 shows the number of tariff lines with positive exports for every combination of RoO 
defined under the agreement.   
Table 1 here: Description of RoO under NAFTA. 
 
Estevadeordal (2000) was the first to propose a discrete RoO index based on an “observation 
rule” to measure the restrictiveness of the resulting complex system of PSRO. The rule was based 
on two assumptions. The first one, a change at the level of chapter (CC) is more restrictive than a 
                                                                                                                                                  
Nomenclature comprises 20 sections further subdivided into 96 chapters (commodity group identified by 2-digit code). 
Chapters are subdivided into headings (4-digit codes) and subheadings (6-digit codes, about 5000 of them), where the 
harmonization stops. Some administrations such as Eurostat use finer classifications (up to 10 digits). 
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than a change at the level of sub-heading (CS), and so on. The second assumption states that the 
value content criterion (VC) and the technical requirements (TECH) attached to a given change of 
tariff classification (CTC) add restrictiveness to the RoO.  Based on this observation rule, the 
resulting ordinal index (Ri) assigns a single value, ranking from 1 (less stringent) to 7 (more 
stringent), to the restrictiveness of RoO (i.e.: 17 i R   ). Subsequently, Cadot et al (2006c) 
modified the index mainly by taking into consideration exceptions and allowances. Appendix A2 
details the construction of their index (henceforth the R-index) that is used in this study.   
The last column of table 1 presents the value of the R-index assigned to all combinations of 
PSRO existing in NAFTA at the HS-6 level of aggregation. The histogram of the distribution of 
the R-index computed for the 4077 tariff lines is shown as figure 1. The bulk of the distribution is 
concentrated around the values of 4 and 7.  
Figure 1 here: Distribution of R-index for NAFTA 
Table 1 shows that RoO under NAFTA are complex and heterogeneous across products.  One 
can argue that the fact that HS classification was not elaborated to determine origin can bring 
about complex combinations of PSRO.  However, RoO can be simpler as in the case of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) where they are formulated as a single minimum regional 
content value of 40% for basically all products.  Indeed, the fact that under some PTAs, RoO are 
simpler and more homogeneous across product lines, may be interpreted as evidence that the 
complexity of RoO facilitates capture by special interests groups by reducing the scope for free-
riding resulting in greater lobbying activities.  Thus, complex RoO can be “made-to-measure”, i.e. 
tailored to the needs of the interests groups.  
In addition to the inevitable arbitrariness involved in setting up the observation rule, the R-
index has other shortcomings.
8 In particular, the R-index is an ordinal rather than cardinal 
measure. To remedy these problems, one would want to build an equivalent measure of 
restrictiveness of the combinations of RoO in terms of a single continuous index, say for instance, 
a minimum local content measure. However, information on the production process of a good  - 
                                                 
8 For an elaboration of some of the shortcomings of the R-index, see e.g. Erasmus et al. (2006). 
  9detailed enough to compute such a measure-  is difficult to obtain. Notice from table 1 that there 
is no single product under NAFTA having a VC rule without being combined with other type of 
PSRO. 
 
4.  Estimation 
4.1. Methodology and data 
The analysis is restricted to the interaction between Mexico and the United States, leaving 
Canada aside, as in previous empirical studies for NAFTA. This choice is dictated by data 
availability but can also be justified on several grounds.  For example, many observers pointed 
out that the initiative to turn the initial US-Mexico negotiations into NAFTA came mainly from 
Canada, motivated by the fear of potential trade diversionary effects of a US-Mexico FTA and, 
thus, in order to preserve some of the gains achieved under the pre-existing US-Canada FTA.
9   
Based on the above discussion, it is convenient to view RoO as determined in a two-stage 




i R  ) for every good i as the outcome of the interaction between industrial lobbies and the 
national government.
10 Their resulting restrictiveness level is a function of factors generating 




11 and also a function of political economy forces ( ) 
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i
.  In the second stage, RoO that will finally prevail 
under the agreement, (RoO ), are established during negotiations between government 
representatives.  For instance, one could envisage that for each tariff line, the negotiated RoO, 
                                                 
9 For example, Orne (2006) wrote that “Canada’s bargaining weakness was most evident in the critical area of rules of 
origin […]. And finally, NAFTA is about Mexico. NAFTA extends North American industrial society south into a 
relatively closed and much poorer economy. Canada is necessarily a bystander in this process.  It never sought 
Mexico’s inclusion in the FTA, and it was powerless to prevent it. NAFTA is ultimately bilateral, a pact between 
Mexico City and Washington to which Ottawa, under any government, must reluctantly subscribe”.  
10 For instance, the framework under which the national political process formation,  , takes place can be viewed as 




11 Local producers may be concerned about the risk of re-exporting in the partner country and will ask their government 
for stricter RoO to prevent it whenever the partner has a lower MFN tariff and depending on the sectoral characteristics.    
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i RoO  is obtained under a Nash bargaining game in which case we could write a reduced-form 
expression:  
  
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ii i i i  =  h, ,, h,,,, ,
US Mex US US Mex Mex
i RoO R R PE TD PE TD     
i       (1)  
where 
US  and 
Mex  would be the US and Mexican Nash weight coefficients representing their 
respective bargaining power. 
Taking a linear approximation to expression (1), one could then summarize the result of the 
bargaining process as: 
       =   + ii i RoO TD PE i      (2) 
To confront (2) to the data, I approximate the restrictiveness of the RoO by the R-index 
mentioned before which is defined at the HS-6 level of aggregation at which RoO were defined 
under NAFTA
12. Explanatory variables are grouped in two vectors. The first one,TD , contains 
variables controlling for the prospect of trade deflection, the problem RoO are supposed to 
prevent.  Parameters of this vector are intended to capture the degree of restrictiveness that is 
justified on the grounds of trade deflection, i.e. the degree of restrictiveness if negotiated RoO 
were exclusively dedicated to this purpose. The second vector,  , includes variables that serve 
as proxy of identified political economy forces from both countries, as will be explained later.   
PE
Including sectoral dummies, an implementable version of model  (2) becomes: 
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  
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   
  (3) 
where all variables are defined for tariff line i at the HS-6 level of aggregation: 
-   
,, 0,
US Mex MFN US MFN Mex
ii i Max t t  
,
                                                
is the difference between the 1993 US MFN tariff and the 
1993 Mexican MFN tariff, when the former is higher, and zero otherwise. 
 
12 It is worth mentioning that the allusion to a theoretical framework is to add context, and a bargaining set-
up seems as appropriate as any other.  To get mileage from a more elaborated political-economy set-up 
along the lines of Hillman’s (1989) or  Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) models, disaggregated data –at 
least at the HS-6 level- such  as production, input-output coefficients would be necessary.  
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Rauch
i I  is the Rauch (1999) index of product differentiation taking three integer values. 
Rauch




i t is the US MFN tariff for 1993; 
-  
US
i RCAI   
Mex
i RCAI  is the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index for the US 
(Mexico) for good i averaged out over 1991-1993, the three-year  period preceding the 
implementation of NAFTA
13; 
-    
,, US RoW US World US Mex
ii i XXX 
,  and   
,, , Mex RoW Mex World Mex US
ii i XXX   are US and Mexico  
exports to the RoW (i.e. all countries other than US or Mexico) averaged out over 1991-1993;  
-   ji D  is a sectoral dummy that is equal to 1 if good i belongs to section j, and zero otherwise 
(for j=1…20). 
Trade and tariff data was compiled from COMTRADE.  I briefly describe the variables 
included in each vector. 
 
i) Trade Deflection (TD ) 
What creates an opportunity for trade deflection is, above all, the fact that one of the FTA 
partners has a lower tariff to third parties. Therefore,     
,, 0,
US Mex MFN US MFN Mex
ii i Max t t  
,
, is a 
primary indicator of the propensity to trade deflection towards the US that may happen when 
MFN tariffs are higher in the US than in Mexico. A positive and significant coefficient would be 
evidence that more stringent RoO were negotiated in tariff lines where there were greater 
incentives for trade deflection towards the US.  Since the MFN tariffs were greater in Mexico 
than in the US for the majority of lines, it is natural to incorporate 
Mex US
i   
   
,, 0,
MFN Mex MFN US
ii Max t t   in the model, which is the variable that symmetrically controls for 
                                                 
 , jk 13 Notice that:  , where   is exports of good i from 
country j to country (or group of countries) k. 
,, , , // /
ii i i
j j World j World j World j World
i
ij i j
RCAI X X X X
 
  
      i X
  12potential trade deflection towards Mexico. Nevertheless, when doing so, its coefficient is not 
significant, as shown in estimates in next section. Thus, the variable is not retained in model (3).  
Also included in vector TD is the Rauch (1999) index of differentiation (
Rauch
i I ) which 
classifies goods into three categories according to their degree of differentiation. First, 
“homogeneous goods” include products internationally traded in organized exchanges, with a 
well-defined price, such as wheat (
Rauch
i I =1). Second, “reference-priced ” goods  include products 
not traded in organized exchanges, but having reference prices available in specialized 
publications, such as polyethylene (
Rauch
i I =2). Third, “differentiated goods” do not satisfy either 
of the two previous criteria (
Rauc
i I
h=3). Because of their nature, homogenous goods can be more 
easily subject to “trade-deflection” or “re-exporting” than differentiated goods.
14 Then, the less 
differentiated a good, the bigger the room for trade deflection and the more justifiable restrictive 
RoO may appear to prevent this problem. The RoO equation in this paper is the first one to 
control for the degree of differentiation of a good. 
 
ii) Political Economy ( )  PE
The US MFN tariff for 1993, 
, MFN US
i t , is included to control for the extent of preferential 
market access to the US under NAFTA. A positive and significant coefficient would capture 
situations where RoO are more stringent in products for which greater market access was 
provided, as found in previous studies.  Indeed, US industrial groups that managed to obtain 
higher MFN tariffs for their products prior to NAFTA were serious candidates to receive 
enhanced trade protection through additionally stricter RoO under NAFTA. 
                                                 
14 To clarify this point, imagine a country member to an FTA that can import a homogenous good, say sugar, and a 
differentiated good, say car engines, but that can also produce them locally at higher production costs. In addition 
suppose the country has the lowest MFN tariffs for these goods in the FTA. This fact combined with the fact that both 
merchandises can be stocked creates an incentive for re-exporting both goods.  However, pretending that a foreign 
engine is locally made is more difficult vis-à-vis customs certification, than pretending that foreign sugar is locally 
produced. 
  13The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices for the US and Mexico  ,
US
i RCAI  

Mex
i RCAI are proxies for industry competitiveness for each country prior to the signature of 
NAFTA. Notice that when the RCA index is larger than one for a given product, the percentage 
share of that sector in exports is larger than the world average and the country is said to have a 
“revealed” comparative advantage in the sector; and vice versa when the RCA index is below one.  
The sign of the estimated coefficients for these variables intend to capture the asymmetry in 
relative bargaining power and lobby effectiveness by exporters and import-competing sectors 
from the two countries. On one hand, larger exporters of good i prior to NAFTA may be 
associated with a more competitive export sector in one country that would eventually lobby for 
fast access to the NAFTA partner through non-binding or lenient RoO . On the other hand, import 
competing sectors of the same good in the other country have interest to lobby for stricter RoO in 
order to prevent prices and profits from falling further as a consequence of accrued market access 
to rivals from the partner country. Many forces are at work and the net result would depend upon 
the relative strength of such forces. Yet, a positive sign, say for the coefficient of 
US
i RCAI , would 
indicate that US import-competing producers prevail in imposing stricter RoO over Mexican 
interests. 




i X ) are 
taken as  a proxy for the potential size of import penetration once the agreement is implemented. 
Indeed, the larger a country’s exports of a given product to the RoW prior to potential market 
access granted by NAFTA, the higher the volume of goods subject to potential “rerouting” from 
the RoW towards the partner country once trade preferences are in place; thus, the higher the 
“threat” of import penetration in the importing country. Analogously, if the restrictiveness of RoO 
is positively associated with this variable for one of the partner countries, it may imply that import 
competing lobby groups from the other country managed to set stricter RoO in sectors where 
exports of the first country to the partner could increase significantly once the trade agreement is 
in place. 
  14Under the assumption that the influence of US exporters’ interests- and especially US 
importers’ interests- strictly prevail over interests of their Mexican counterparts, the following 
coefficient signs are expected when estimating equation (3): 0 ˆ1   ,  0 ˆ2   ,  0 ˆ3   ,  0 ˆ4   , 
and  0 ˆ5   . 
In implementing (3), the trade-related explanatory variables are either averaged out over a 
three year period preceding NAFTA, as in the case of the RCA indices and the export figures, or 
are figures corresponding to 1993, the year previous to NAFTA implementation, as in the case of 
tariff data.  The rationale for this choice is that industrial groups willing to influence RoO during 
negotiations assessed their gains or losses, only by taking into consideration information available 
until this date. Moreover, a potential source of endogeneity bias is circumvented by taking 
explanatory variables corresponding to a period prior to the entry into force of the trade 
agreement.  Section dummies included in the model are assumed to control for unobserved time-
invariant sector characteristics.  
The paper focuses solely on RoO, despite the fact that preferential tariff phase-out periods 
were other key instruments denying market access and subject to negotiations that could 
simultaneously have been determined with RoO and have analogous effects. However, those 
instruments have only a temporary character as opposed to RoO, which are, presumably, 
permanent
15. Indeed, most import tariffs disappeared before the first ten years of operation. 
Besides, phase-out periods are highly and significantly correlated with the R-index 
16 and it is 
safe to assume that both policies are complementary in the short run.  
                                                 
15 Although, they can in principle be subject to renegotiation in some PTAs, RoO under NAFTA have not been 
renegotiated to this day. 
16 Estevadeordal (2000) estimates a two-equation model with a two-stage procedure where the number of years to 
liberalization is the dependent variable in one of then and RoO is the dependent variable in the other one, while being 
also a regressor in the former equation.  In this model, tariff phase-out periods are determined by RoO, but the converse 
is not true.  The appendix of that article explains that the main econometric problem of estimating a system where the 
number of years to liberalization is also added as a regressor in the RoO equation would be the extreme complexity and 
non-linearity of the resulting likelihood function. Thus, he recognizes that this likelihood function would be difficult to 
maximize using standard methods. 
  15Since the dependent variable, the R-index, is an ordered categorical variable, the econometric 
specification is set-up as an ordered probit model. Then, quantitative interpretation of parameter 
estimates in terms of equation (3) is not possible. Therefore, in order to assess the relative 
importance of the two sets of determinants of RoO, I propose to estimate two “counterfactual” 
distributions of the R-index under two “hypothetical” scenarios or states, using the estimates of 
the parameters of the ordered probit model.  In the first state (hereafter state A), all explanatory 
variables are set equal to the mean value in the regression sample (i.e.  i TD TD   and    i PE  PE ). 
In the second state (hereafter state B), “political economy” factors are cancelled out by setting all 
variables in vector   to zero ( ) while keeping all other explanatory at their sample 
mean value (
PE 0 i PE 
i TD TD  ).  Notice that state A is a benchmark for state B.   
 
4.2. Results 
The estimation is carried out in cross-section with 4,074 observations at the HS-6 level of 
aggregation at which the R-index is defined. Descriptive statistics are summarized in table 2. 
Table 2 here:  Descriptive statistics 
 
As in Cadot et al (2006b), observations are weighted by the total Mexican exports averaged 
out over 1990-1993 to estimate the ordered probit models. The rationale for this choice is that 
observations where Mexico was a larger exporter prior to NAFTA are given higher importance. 
This empirical choice does not change significantly the estimates, but improves the goodness of 
fit of the model as will be shown in robustness checks.  
Table 3 reports the ordered probit estimates for three specifications. All coefficients keep the 
same signs across specifications. Under the assumption that the influence of US import-oriented 
and US exporter’s interests prevail, most coefficients have expected signs. The only exception is 
the positive sign of  4 ˆ   implying that lines where the US producers had a larger volume of exports 
to countries other than Mexico are associated with stricter RoO.  The overall fit of the models, as 
summarized in the pseudo-R
2 values, seems reasonable. 
Table 3 here: Regression results 
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Column (1) of table 3 shows results for the full specification (equation (3)).  Specification (2) 
incorporates 
, Mex US
i  controlling for potential trade deflection towards Mexico. As the coefficient is 
not significant, there is no evidence that trade deflection towards Mexico is a concern driving 
RoO restrictiveness. By opposition, RoO seem to be largely influenced by the US in the few lines 
in which there is potential room for trade deflection to the US, as illustrated by the coefficient of 




The discrete Rauch index, 
Rauch






 ) that are 






 ] is equal to one if good i is 
homogenous [differentiated], and zero, otherwise.  Again, homogeneous goods are associated 
with more stringent RoO, whereas differentiated goods are associated with more lenient ones.   
The parameters   ˆ ˆ  ,  

 estimated from the specifications reported in table 3, as well as the 
estimated cut-offs       5 4 3 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , c c c 2 1 ˆ , ˆ c c  and  , ˆ6 c  (not reported in table 3 to save space), are 
used to obtain two “counterfactual” distributions of the R-index for a hypothetical good having 
average characteristics under state A  ( i TD TD   and  i PE  PE ) which is the benchmark, and 
state B ( i TD TD   and  ).  As discussed before, by comparing them, the influence of 
political economy factors on the restrictiveness of RoO could be estimated in probabilistic terms. 
0  i PE
Figure 2 here: Counterfactual distribution for specification 1 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the distributions of the R-index under the two scenarios, computed with 
estimated parameters of the retained specification. Since the distributions of the R-index 
estimated for the other specifications are similar, only the expected value of these distributions is 
tabulated in table 4 for comparison purposes. Without exception, the probability of RoO taking 
higher values is higher under state A than under state B, as reflected by a greater expected value 
of the estimated distribution of the R-index in the first row of table 4, implying that political 
economy considerations contribute to more stringent RoO. 
  17Table 4 here: Estimates of the expected value of counterfactual distributions 
 
 
Since counterfactual distributions are estimated for a hypothetical good having mean sample 
characteristics, section dummy variables are set equal to their sample average values under both 
states.  Notice that by doing so, only the omission of  ‘detected’  political economy factors is 
considered when computing the counterfactual distribution of the R-index under state B ( ,  0 i PE 
i TD TD  ).  Accordingly, even if estimates show, on average, a significant increase of the 
restrictiveness of RoO due to political economy forces, this increase can still be deemed as 
somehow conservative for at least two reasons.  
First, one has to be cautious while interpreting section dummies controlling for unobserved 
fixed effects, since the net effect of estimated section dummy coefficients (not reported in table 3) 
is positive and remains unchanged when estimating the two counterfactual distributions. On the 
one hand, from the point of view of trade deflection, section dummies capture certain unobserved 
technological or production characteristics that justify a differentiated degree of restrictiveness in 
RoO relative to goods from other sections.  On the other hand, section dummies can capture 
political economy factors not explicitly identified in the vector , such as the labor intensity of 
the industry. Moreover, they can be interpreted as capturing an average level of restrictiveness 
within each section that corresponds to an average amount of required transformation that, 
obviously, was not captured by other regressors.  
PE
Second, there may be other forces pushing for stringent rules of origin, such as upstream 
industrial groups willing to capture the market of intermediate goods in the partner countries 
through stricter RoO, such as quantified in Cadot et al. (2004) and further discussed in Cadot et al 
(2006b). If these additional factors were identified, the estimated counterfactual distribution of the 
R-index under state B ( ,  0 i PE  i TD TD  ) would move further to the left in figure 2. However, 
we do not have data available at the HS-6 level (e.g. rents, input-output coefficients, etc) to take 
into account potential upstream lobby capture in our estimates. Taking this data limitation into 
  18account, the counterfactual distribution can be interpreted as an upper bound of the restrictiveness 
of RoO when “detected” political economy factors are cancelled out.  
Estimates in table 5 are aimed to check the robustness of the retained specification (1), which 
is reproduced in the first column.  Specification 4 uses ordinary least square estimation to check 
that coefficient signs are unchanged. 
Table 5 here: Robustness checks 
 
In specification (5) the Rauch index,  , is replaced by another version  , having a 
greater number of products comprised in the categories “homogenous” and “reference priced” and 








17. Coefficients remain similar but the pseudo R
2 
is lower than in the retained specification.  Specification (6) reports estimates from an ordered 
probit model where -unlike in previous specifications- observations are unweighted. Compared to 
the original specification, the coefficient of  is negative though not significant, whereas 
the coefficient of    is negative and significant as opposed to specification (1).  Here, 
lines where Mexican exports to the RoW were larger in volume were associated with stricter 
RoO. It can be interpreted as evidence of enhanced protection on product lines that may be judged 
as “threatening” for US import-competing producers.  However, overall, the original specification 







                                                 
17 Rauch (1999) proposes a conservative and liberal version of the index (  and  ) that are derived  
respectively from two classifications where the number of commodities classified as either “homogeneous” or 
“reference priced” are either maximized or minimized.  The sample of 4077 observations at the HS -6 level are divided 






i I  (conservative)  2,
Rauch
i I (liberal) 
“homogeneous”  Rauch
i I = 1  219 obs. 
2,
Rauch
i I = 1  333 obs. 
“reference priced”  Rauch
i I = 2  1219 obs. 
2,
Rauch
i I = 2  1259 obs. 
“differentiated”  Rauch
i I = 3  2639 obs 
2,
Rauch
i I = 3  2485 obs. 
 
For both versions of the index, most of the observations are classified as “differentiated" but variation is ensured by an 
adequate number of observations for goods either listed as “homogeneous” and “reference priced”. 
  19In general, the original specification is robust to different estimation methods and 





i RCAI     and RoO restrictiveness that seems constant across 
most regressions
18 is another contribution of this work.  This robust relationship is evidence of the 
asymmetric power of negotiation of both countries while setting RoO. 
Measurement error or misspecification of the dependent variable is a further problem to 
consider when estimating discrete choice models. Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) suggest a 
general model in which the observed dependent variable is a stochastic function of the underlying 
latent one.  However, it is difficult in our case to state how the misspecification takes place. 
Without knowing precisely how the misspecification has to be integrated in the likelihood 
function to be maximized, the use of this technique can lead to inconsistent estimates, as warned 
by the authors.   
Analogous to the estimates in table 4, the last two rows in table 5 report the estimates of the 
expected value of the estimated R-index under state A    ,  ii TD TD PE PE   and B 
   ,  0 ii TD TD PE 
                                                
 which is also higher under the former state. 
Finally, in order to have rough estimates on the costs associated to the PE component, I refer 
to Carrère and de Melo (2006) who carried out estimates of costs for some types of PSRO under 
NAFTA. Based on the responsiveness of utilization rates of trade preferences to RoO and 
preferential rates, they estimated the costs associated to three types of different PSRO: CC, RVC 
and TECH
19. For example, an increase in the R-index from a value of “5” to a value of “6”, which 
is close to the counterfactual average changes depicted in tables 4 and 5, would be equivalent, for 
instance, to adding either a VC to a CH requirement combined with an exception (EXC) 
 
18 The only exception is the negative coefficient of  Mex
i RCAI  in specification 5. However, the coefficient is not 
significant. 
19 The costs estimated for  CC, RVC and TECH are respectively equal to 3,84%, 3.47% and 11.39% of the price of a 
good. It was impossible to carry out finer distinction of costs related to other types of change of tariff classification 
(CH, CS or CI levels) or exceptions in their econometric estimates due to quasi-perfect multicollinearity between the 
dummy variables identifying them. Hence, only the costs of some combinations of PSRO under NAFTA, listed in table 
1, can be estimated using these figures. 
  20(corresponding to a value of “5” of the R-index, see table 1). According to the estimates in 
Carrère and de Melo (2006) such an increase in the restrictiveness index would entail a rise of 
3.47 % in costs as a percentage of the price of the good.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
RoO can be seen as devices used to cushion the distributive effects of an FTA on import-
competing and export-oriented producers and, as such, they are subject to capture by interest 
groups representing these producers. Because of their complexity, their opaqueness, and the fact 
that they are defined at a quite disaggregated level, RoO can be seen as well-targeted instruments 
for protection since they are in effect “made-to-measure” thereby overcoming the “free-rider” 
problem inherent in more transparent protective devices such as tariffs.  Rules of origin can also 
raise trade costs for exporters and importers – an increasingly important factor in the trading 
environment particularly in relation to finding ways to expand trade for developing countries.   
In many ways, RoO are akin to traditional rent-seeking activities associated with quantitative 
restrictions; all in all, RoO are non-tariff barriers in the context of PTAs short of a customs union. 
This paper represents an attempt to estimate the impact of lobbying activities directed towards 
capturing these rents on the restrictiveness of RoO, and to estimate the costs associated with them.   
Despite the caveats due to the use a synthetic index to represent the complexity inherent in the 
array of PSRO typical to qualify for preferences, the estimations seem plausible. The main 
finding is that political economy forces, especially from the US, significantly raised the 
restrictiveness of the RoO. The overall results confirm a strong inertia in protectionism in the US 
where import-competing sectors that were most protected before NAFTA obtained stricter RoO, 
to the detriment of Mexican exporters.  
Conversely, US export-oriented industries that appear more competitive in the years 
preceding NAFTA were granted more lenient RoO. This can be interpreted as further evidence on 
the asymmetric power of negotiation in a North-South FTA. The South, in particular, stands to be 
damaged by RoO that can be easily manipulated to negate market-access promises made by the 
  21North in the course of negotiations. This research attempts to measure “detectable” political 
economy forces raising the stringency of RoO. Nevertheless, it is likely that other forces pushing 
for harsher RoO are also at play. Among the more important ones is upstream lobbying leading to 
capture of intermediate markets in partner countries, for which data are not available to take them 
into account in our estimates.  From this perspective, our estimates of the stringency of RoO due 
to political economy forces can be seen as a lower bound.  .   
With respect to prospective North-South preferential trade agreements, the political economy 
proxies used in the model may provide rough guidance to identify ex-ante the sectors that are 
vulnerable to protectionism through restrictive RoO.  
Trade deflection plays an important role as far as the US is concerned.  RoO were demanded 
and pushed largely by the US in lines where there was a risk for potential trade deflection to the 
US.  Conversely, no evidence has been found that preventing trade deflection towards Mexico 
plays a role driving RoO restrictiveness. 
Finally, this paper does not provide an estimate of trade or welfare effects of RoOs; it is a 
study of the determinants of RoOs.  Nevertheless, drawing on Carrere and de Melo’s (2006) cost 
estimates for some forms of RoO under NAFTA, the counterfactual estimates in this paper 
suggest that lobbying activities associated with the determination of RoO might have increased 
the costs of RoO on average by 3.5% of the price of a good. While the estimates here should be 
considered a “first attempt” at disentangling political-economy from trade deflection motives and 
are very rough indeed, they are coherent with the accumulating evidence of rent-seeking activities 
by well-organized interest-groups in the preference-granting country. 
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Source: author’s estimates using data in Cadot et al (2006c) 
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  Pr / , ii i RoO TD TD PE PE     
  Pr / , 0 ii i RoO TD TD PE   
       Source: author’s estimates
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Table 1 
Description of RoO under NAFTA. 
 
RoO criteria  Observations.  R-index 
  (HS-6 level)  value (*) 
NC 2  0.05%  1 
I + EXC 1 0.02%  2 
SH   42 1.03%  2 
SH  +EXC 113 2.77%  3 
SH  +TECH 2 0.05%  3 
SH  +EXC+TECH 20 0.49%  3 
H 736 18.05% 4 
I + EXC+VC2 1 0.02%  5 
SH  +EXC+VC2 4 0.10%  5 
H +EXC 720 17.66% 5 
H +TECH 1 0.02%  5 
H +EXC+TECH 2 0.05%  5 
H +VC1 21 0.52%  5 
H +VC2 140 3.43%  6 
H +EXC+VC1 25 0.61%  6 
C 1188 29.14% 6 
H +EXC+VC2 3 0.07%  7 
H +TECH+VC2
  5 0.12%  7 
C +EXC 775 19.01% 7 
C +TECH 1 0.02%  7 
C +EXC +TECH 275 6.75%  7 
Total lines  4077 100%    
 
Notes: 
C = Change in Chapter / H = Change in Heading / SH  = Change in Subheading / I = Change in 
Item /  EXC = Exception to Change of Tariff Classification / RC1 = Regional Value Content <60% / RC2 = 
Regional Value Content 60% / TECH = Technical Requirement. 
(*) The ordinal R-index takes values 1 ,  with higher values corresponding to more 
stringent requirements. 
7 i RoO 
Source: author’s estimates using data in Cadot et al (2006c) 












Source: author’s estimates  
 
VARIABLE Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
       
i RoO   4077 5.571 1.209 
, US Mex
i    4077 0.003 0.016 
Rauch
i I   4077 2.594 0.591 
, MFN US
i t   4077 0.036 0.053 
US
i RCAI   4077 0.989 0.869 
Mex








i X   4077 9.947 3.945 




Specif. 1  Specif. 2  Specif. 3    
   R-index R-index R-index 
8.133 8.032 8.036  , US Mex
i    [2.088]*** [2.114]*** [2.101]*** 
 0.136     , Mex US
i     [0.425]    
-0.391 -0.393    Rauch
i I   [0.073]*** [0.074]***   
   0.489  1 Rauch
i I

     [0.114]*** 
   -0.293  3 Rauch
i I

     [0.113]*** 
1.304 1.425 1.359  , MFN US
i t   [0.785]* [0.873]* [0.787]* 
-0.433 -0.431 -0.434  US
i RCAI   [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** 
0.015 0.015 0.015  Mex
i RCAI   [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
0.076 0.077 0.075  
, ln
US RoW
i X   [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** 
0.059 0.059 0.058   
, ln
Mex RoW
i X   [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
Observations  4074 4074 4074 
Pseudo R2  0.423 0.423 0.423 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%  























Estimates of the expected value of counterfactual distributions 






Source: author’s estimates  
   / , ii i E RoO TD TD PE PE   
  5.748  5.748  5.750 
      / , 0 ii i E RoO TD TD PE   
  4.945  4.941  4.972 
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Robustness checks. 
 
Specif. 1 Specif. 4 Specif. 5 Specif. 6    
   R- index  R- index  R- index  R- index 
8.133 2.923 8.918 -0.386 , US Mex
i   
[2.088]*** [1.045]***[2.063]*** [1.475] 
-0.391 -0.047   -0.276 Rauch
i I   [0.073]*** [0.037]     [0.037]*** 
1.304  0.091 1.017 0.805 , MFN US
i t   [0.785]* [0.414]  [0.780]  [0.485]* 
-0.433 -0.326 -0.428 -0.073 US
i RCAI   [0.035]*** [0.021]***[0.035]*** [0.024]*** 
0.015 0.001 0.016 0.013 Mex
i RCAI   [0.005]*** [0.003] [0.005]***  [0.008]* 
0.076 0.039 0.074 0.082 
, ln
US RoW
i X   [0.013]*** [0.008]***[0.013]*** [0.010]*** 
0.059 0.037 0.066 -0.015 
, ln
Mex RoW
i X   [0.010]*** [0.006]***[0.010]*** [0.005]*** 
      -0.209   , Rauch L
i I         [0.062]***   
   5.625     
Constant 
     [0.460]***     
  Observations  4074  4074  4074  4074 
  R-squared   0.67    















Expected value of counterfactual distributions 
 
  Specif. 1   Specif. 5 Specif. 6 
    / , ii i E RoO TD TD PE PE   

 5.748  5.740  5.666 
    / , 0 ii i E RoO TD TD PE   
  4.945  4.913  4.651 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
All regressions contain section dummies. 
 
    Source: author’s estimates  
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APPENDIX A.1. Regime-wide rules.  
Regime-wide rules can include:  
(i) a de minimis (or tolerance) criterion which stipulates a maximum percentage of non-
originating materials that can be used without affecting the origin of the final product. 
(ii) Cumulation allows FTA producers to import non-originating materials from other FTA 
member countries without affecting the final product’s originating status. Three types of 
cumulation rules are distinguished: bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation. Bilateral cumulation is 
most common and applies to trade between two partners in a FTA. It stipulates that producers in 
country A can use inputs from country B without affecting the final good’s originating status 
provided that the inputs are themselves originating (i.e. provided that they themselves satisfy the 
area’s ROOs). Under diagonal cumulation, countries tied by the same FTA can use materials that 
originate in any member country as if the materials were originating in the country where the 
processing is undertaken. Finally, under full cumulation, all stages of processing or 
transformation of a product within the FTA can be counted as qualifying content regardless of 
whether the processing is sufficient to confer originating status to the materials themselves. It is 
easy to show that full cumulation allows for greater fragmentation of the production process than 
the more commonly used bilateral and diagonal cumulation, and hence is less restrictive. 
   (iii) The absorption or roll-up principle allows non-originating materials which have 
acquired origin by meeting specific processing requirements to maintain this origin when used as 
  31input in a subsequent transformation. In other words, the non-originating materials are no longer 
taken into account in calculating value added.  
(iv)  Duty drawbacks are refunds to exporters of tariffs paid on imported intermediate inputs. 
Many PTAs, especially in the Americas, mandate the elimination of duty-drawback schemes for 
exports to partner countries, on the ground that a duty drawback claimed by a producer in A to 
export to B would put that producer at a competitive advantage compared to domestic producers 
in B given that the A-producer already benefits from the elimination of intra-bloc tariffs. The 
elimination of duty drawbacks as part of a PTA’s formation can imply a cut in the profitability of 
final-good assembly for export to partner countries in the area, although tariff escalation, when 
present, already provides some protection for final-assembly operations (as it implies lower tariffs 
on intermediate goods than on final ones). 
(v) Certification method. Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006) and Cadot et al (2006c) detail 
the RoO for the several North-South trade agreements having either the US or the EU as the main 
partner. 
 
APPENDIX A.2. Construction of the R-index 
This annex describes the construction of the restrictiveness index (R-index) by Cadot et al 
(2006b) based on the observation rule of Estevadeordal (2000). Let CC stand for a change of 
chapter, CH for a change of heading, CS for a change of subheading, and CI for a change of 
item. The index is based on the following classification convention for Change of Tariff 
Classification (CTC) criteria: 
CC > CH > CS > CI. 
In most cases, a CTC criterion is always accompanied by one or two (in a few cases even 3) 
of the other requirements such as Value Content, Technical Requirement, Exception, Wholly 
obtained criterion, and Allowances. A value of 2 is assigned to a Change of Subheading, 4 to a 
Change of Heading and 6 to a Change of Chapter. Therefore the observation rule assigns higher 
values to the index resulting from the CTC when these other requirements are added (and assigns 
a lower value in the case of allowance being followed after the CTC criteria).  For instance, from 
  32table A1, a change of Heading -CH takes a value of 4, but the value increases to a 5 when CH 
is accompanied by R1(Wholly obtained criteria) or R2(either one of CS, Technical Requirement 
and Exception). Conversely, it takes a lower value of 3 when it is accompanied by an Allowance 
Requirement.  
In the case of a Value Content requirement,  a cut-off point of 60% originating is used a value 
of 4 is assigned to a VC strictly smaller than 60% (VC1), and of 5 to a VC higher than or equal to 
60% (VC2). Therefore whenever a VC is combined with other requirements (including a CTC) 
the assigned value will depend on whether the percentage of VC is higher or lower compared to 
the cut-off point of 60%. (See details in table A1.) 
Allowances are treated as mitigating factors that make the index jump down one level. In 
several cases, however, allowances are given along with certain restrictions such as adding a 
Value Content restriction (AllowVC). Exceptions are treated as aggravating factors making the 
index jump up one level. Exceptions as a stand alone are assigned a value of 2. 
Table A1 lists the different combinations of RoO found by Cadot et al. for some of the US 
and EU preferential trade regimes and the assigned value of the R-index.  
  33Table A1 The Observation Rule to construct the R index 
r=1 (R1) if   
y*=NC 
 y*=WH 
 y*=R2+allow  (*) 
 
r=2  (R2) if     
y*=CS   
   y*=TECH   
y*=EXC 
y*=R1+R2 
   
r=3  if     
y*=R2+R2   
y*=CH +allow (*) 
    




      y*=CH+R2+allow (*)  
 




y*=CH +R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +R1 (or R2)+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +VC1 
y*=CH +VC1+R1 (or R2) +allow (*)  
 
r=6 if      
y*=CC or 
y*=VC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +VC2 
y*=CH +VC2+R1 +allow (*) 
y*=CH +VC1+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +VC1+ R1 (or R2) +R1(or R2) 
y*=VC1+R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
 
 r=7  if    
y*=VC2+ R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +VC2+R1 (or R2) 
y*=CH +VC2+ R1 (or R2) +R1 (or R2) 
y*=CC +R1 (or R2) 
y*=CC +VC 
y*=CC +R1 (or R2)+ R1(or R2) 
y*=CC +VC+R1 (or R2)+ R1(or R2) 
 
Note: y* is the latent variable approximated by the observation rule and assignment to the corresponding R value on the left-hand 
side column; 
 
(*) allowances only apply for ROO under PTAs signed by the EU.  VC1 if VC>40, VC2 if  VC <=40.  
 
Source:  Cadot et al. (2006c)
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APPENDIX A.3.  Examples of Rules of Origin under NAFTA 
1. Change of tariff classification 
HS code Product description 
500100 SILKWORM COCOONS SUITABLE FOR REELING 
500200 RAW SILK (NOT THROWN) 
500310 SILK WASTE, NOT CARDED OR COMBED 
500390 SILK WASTE, NESOI 
500400 SILK YARN, NOT SPUN FROM WASTE, NOT RETAIL PACKED 
500500 YARN SPUN FROM SILK WASTE NOT PUT UP RETAIL SALE 
500600 SILK YARN & YARN FROM WASTE RETAIL PK; SILKWM GUT 
WOVEN FABRICS OF NOIL SILK 
WOV FAB OV 85% SILK OR SILK WASTE EXCEPT NOIL SLK 
R SILK WASTE, NESOI 
HS codes/group Applicable Product-specific Rule of Origin (PSRO) 
5001-5003  A change to heading 5001 through 5003 from any other chapte
500710
500720
500790 WOVEN FABRICS OF SILK O
r.  
5004-5006  A change to heading 5004 through 5006 from any heading outside that group
A change to heading 50.07 from any other    5007 heading. 
In this example, where products are designated by their HS 6 code (sub-heading) if imported 
inputs are used in making silk yarn (headings 5004-5006) or silk fabric (heading 5007), those 
inputs must belong to different headings. Here the requirement is not overly constraining since 
fabric can be made with imported yarn.     
 
2. Exception 
HS code Product description 
200911 ORANGE JUICE, FROZEN, SWEETENED OR NOT 
200919 ORANGE JUICE, OTHER THAN FROZEN, SWEETENED OR NOT 
200920 GRAPEFRUIT JUICE, SWEETENED OR NOT 
200930 CITRUS FRUIT JUICE FROM A SINGLE FRUIT, NESOI 
HS codes/group Applicable Product-specific Rule of Origin (PSRO) 
200911-200930 
HS code Product description 
MANDARINS (INC TANGER ETC) & CITRUS HYBR FR OR DRI 
LEMONS AND LIMES, FRESH OR DRIED 
RESH OR DRIED 
NC KUMQUATS, NESOI, FRESH OR DRIED 
A change to subheading 200911 through 200930 from any other chapter, 




080590 CITRUS FRUITS, I
except from heading 0805
 
In this example, if imported inputs (presumably fresh oranges) are used to make orange juice 
(subheadings 200911 and 200919), they must belong to a different heading. That benign 
requirement, however, is qualified with an exception concerning heading 0805, which covers 
precisely fresh oranges, grapefruit and citrus fruits.   
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3. Technical requirements 
    Applicable Product-specific Rule of Origin (PSRO)  HS codes/group
 
...of subheading 511111 or 511119, if hand-woven, with a loom width of less than 
 
...certain textile 
76cm, woven in the United Kingdom in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
products 
  Harris Tweed Association, Ltd, and so certified by the Association
Source: Brenton and Imagawa (2004) 
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